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To wear an undeserved dignity.
0, that estates, degrees, and offices
Were not deriv d corruptly, and that clear honour
Were purchased by the merit of the wearer!'
Among the matters that have occupied scholars of the
Constitution of the United States, four related themes have
frequently recurred. One concerns the character of the founding.
The second concerns the ongoing implications of the founding,
both for governing values and for institutional relations,
especially relations between the nation and states. The third
concerns the proper role of the national judiciary-most visibly,
the Supreme Court. Lurking behind all these concerns is a
fourth: the location and character of sovereignty. Mark
Killenbeck's ambitious and insightful article2 takes on all of
these themes.
These are huge matters. Consistent with my limited charge
in this reply, I shall confine myself to two modest purposes. I
shall first recapitulate what I take to be Professor Killenbeck's
basic claims.3 Then I shall offer some critical observations, a
task made more difficult by the fact that there is much in the
article with which I fundamentally agree. With respect to the
former purpose, I should note that I take some liberty with the
organization and presentation of the article's thesis. I hope that,
* Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University Law School. Copyright © by Mark E.
Brandon, 2004.
1. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE MERCHANT OF VENICE act. 2, sc. 9, lines 38-42
(M.M. Mahood ed., 2003).
2. Mark R. Killenbeck, In(re)Dignity: The New Federalism in Perspective, 57 ARK.
L. REV. 1 (2004).
3. I confine myself here to the claims in the instant article and therefore resist
discussing Professor Killenbeck's other excellent work in this area. See, e.g., Mark R.
Killenbeck, The Physics of Federalism, 51 U. KAN. L. REV. 1 (2002).
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in doing so, I avoid doing violence to his argument. With
respect to the latter purpose, I do not attempt a comprehensive
nor systematic account of the Court's various (and dizzily
inconsistent) doctrines, but aim merely to sketch chiaroscuro a
few general questions and observations that might engender
further engagement.
I. KILLENBECK'S THESIS
Professor Killenbeck offers a perceptive critique of the
Supreme Court's recent innovations in federalism. He examines
two related doctrinal areas: (1) the extent of national power,
especially in relation to the power of states; and (2) the claim
that states enjoy sovereign immunity from judicial (and
administrative) actions by private parties, even actions that
Congress has authorized. The commonly cited textual
foundations for the claims of states in these areas are the Tenth
Amendment (for state versus national powers) and the Eleventh
Amendment (for immunity from judicial action). With respect
to both areas, Killenbeck considers also the proper institutional
relation between Congress and the Court.
An early sign that some Justices were willing to insulate
states from general standards of an otherwise constitutional act
of Congress was National League of Cities v. Usery.4 Writing
for the Court, Justice Rehnquist cited the Tenth Amendment to
justify striking down the Fair Labor Standards Act's minimum-
wage and maximum-hours provisions as applied to employees of
states.5  Having overruled an earlier decision,6 however,
National League of Cities itself was overruled nine years later in
Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority.7 If short-
lived, National League of Cities was a portent of things to come,
as Justices Rehnquist, O'Connor and Powell threatened in
dissents in Garcia.
4. 426 U.S. 833, 851-52 (1976) (holding that the Tenth Amendment barred Congress
from protecting the minimum wage and maximum hours of state employees, via the Fair
Labor Standards Act, as amended in 1974).
5. Id. at 852.
6. Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968).
7. 469 U.S. 528, 555-57 (1985) (holding that Congress could regulate the minimum
wage and maximum hours of state employees, via the Fair Labor Standards Act, as
amended in 1974).
8. Id. at 558 (Rehnquist, C.J., & O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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The engine of doctrinal change began to move again in the
latter half of the 1980s, evidenced by CTS Corporation v.
Dynamics Corporation of America.9 It picked up steam in the
early 1990s, with Gregory v. Ashcroft ° and New York v. United
States.1 It took on the appearance of a speeding locomotive in
the mid-1990s, beginning with United States v. Lopez,
12
continuing with a substantial line of decisions, 13 and culminating
in (though likely not terminating with) Federal Maritime
Commission v. South Carolina State Ports Authority.14 The first
of those decisions explicitly overruled a prior decision only
seven years old,' 5 and the last resurrected the shade of a doctrine
that many scholars had considered essentially dead: the notion
9. 481 U.S. 69, 94 (1987) (holding that a state law restricting corporate takeovers
was not preempted by the Williams Act or the "Dormant Commerce Clause").
10. 501 U.S. 452, 473 (1991) (holding that a state's mandatory age for retirement for
certain judges prevailed over a claim that such a requirement violated the federal Age
Discrimination in Employment Act).
11. 505 U.S. 144, 188 (1992) (holding, inter alia, that the United States may not
"commandeer" states to solve problems related to the disposal of nuclear waste).
12. 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995) (striking down the Gun Free School Zones Act of 1990
on a narrow reading of Congress's commerce power).
13. See Board of Tr. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 374 (2001) (holding
that the Americans with Disabilities Act unconstitutionally abrogated the immunity of
states); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 627 (2000) (holding the Violence Against
Women Act to be an unconstitutional intrusion into the province of the states); Kimel v.
Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 91 (2000) (holding that the United States may not
subject states to the jurisdiction of state or federal courts for violating federal statute
prohibiting discrimination against the disabled); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 759-60
(1999) (holding that the United States may not subject states to the jurisdiction of state or
federal courts for violating federal statute mandating the payment of overtime wages);
Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627,
647-48 (1999) (holding the Patent Infringement Remedy Act unconstitutional); see also
College Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 691
(1999) (holding that the United States may not subject states to the jurisdiction of state or
federal courts, in a case involving claims that the state had appropriated for its own use the
trademarked or copyrighted material of private citizens); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S.
898, 935 (1997) (holding that the United States may not "commandeer" states to conduct
background checks on purchasers of firearms); Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S.
44, 75-76 (1996) (holding that Congress's commerce power could not justify abrogation of
states' sovereign immunity).
14. 535 U.S. 743, 760 (2002) (holding that the United States may not subject states to
the jurisdiction of an administrative agency or of the federal courts for violation of
Shipping Act of 1984).
15. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 72 (overruling Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491
U.S. 1, 22-23 (1989), which had upheld, under the Commerce Clause, a federal
environmental statute permitting suits for damages against states).
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of dual sovereignty.' 6  The rest were more coy. To be sure,
there have been a few "outliers," decisions that depart from the
states-rights mold.17 But the general tenor of the Court's recent
decisions, taken as a whole, is that states' reserved powers and
immunity are substantial impediments to congressional policy
and national enforcement.
Political scientists of a behaviorist bent might smugly point
out that the critical shift in doctrine occurred after a notable
change in the composition of the Court. 18  This observation, in
turn, might lend credence to the skeptical position that the
Court's jurisprudence of federalism is explained less by law than
by political ideology. 19  As I read him, Killenbeck is
16. Federal Maritime Comm'n, 535 U.S. at 751 ("Dual sovereignty is a defining
feature of our Nation's constitutional blueprint."). In the early years of the republic, dual
sovereignty was an important part of the jurisprudence of Roger Brooke Taney. See, e.g.,
Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. 393, 401-03, 434-38 (1856); see also THE OXFORD COMPANION
TO THE SUPREME COURT, infra note 72, at 857-59. Dual sovereignty posited that nation
and states were essentially co-equal sovereigns. See, e.g., Scott, 60 U.S. at 438-41. The
aim of the doctrine was to expand the realm of authority in states to regulate commercial
matters beyond the realm permitted in John Marshall's nationalist jurisprudence. The
consequence was to carve out a politically significant role for the Court as referee between
the two sovereigns. By the late 19th century, the doctrine permitted the Court to strike
down legislation of both nation and states that impinged on interests of capital. The
doctrine went into decline in the late 1930s. See WALTER F. MURPHY ET AL., AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 517-22 (2d ed. 1995) (providing a brief, but useful,
discussion).
17. See Pierce County v. Guillen, 537 U.S. 129, 147 (2003) (upholding 23 U.S.C. §
409 (2002) under Congress's commerce power and declaring that certain reports, surveys,
etc., that were compiled by states for the purpose of procuring federal funds for highway
safety, "shall not be subject to discovery or admitted into evidence in a Federal or State
court proceeding or considered for any other purpose in any action for damages arising
from any occurrence at a location mentioned or addressed in such reports, surveys, [etc]")
(quoting 23 U.S.C. § 409)); see also Nevada Dept. of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 123 S. Ct.
1972, 1976 (2003) (upholding provision of the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993
authorizing private claims for damages against a state); Geier v. American Honda Motor
Co., Inc., 529 U.S. 861, 886 (2000) (upholding federal preemption of state law); Jones v.
United States, 529 U.S. 848, 859 (2000) (upholding federal arson statute); Idaho v. Coeur
d'Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S, 261 (1997) (affirming doctrine of Ex Parte Young, 209
U.S. 123, 146 (1908) which permitted suits in federal court for declaratory and injunctive
relief against individual state officials); United States Term Limits v. Thornton, 514 U.S.
779, 837 (1995) (striking down a state's imposition of term limits on candidates for
Congress).
18. During Ronald Reagan's tenure as President, Justice Rehnquist became Chief
Justice and Justices O'Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy were appointed to the Court. George
H. W. Bush appointed Justice Thomas. These are the five Justices who have manufactured
the shift in doctrine.
19. See JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT & THE
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sympathetic to such a suggestion. Hence, his denomination of
the Chief Justice and Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and
Thomas as the "Federalism Five" and his musing about "result-
oriented" jurisprudence. 20 But ideological motive per se is not
Killenbeck's primary concern.
Instead he worries that decisions expressive of the "New
Federalism," as proponents have called it, violate three basic
norms of what I shall call "constitutional legality." First, the
decisions deviate from prior decisions, violating the norm of
stare decisis. Second, they are inconsistent with one another,
violating the norm of rational coherence (or what Ronald
Dworkin has called "articulate consistency"'I). Third, they
violate the Constitution's substantive vision-more specifically,
its structural commitment. Among these three, for Killenbeck,
the third is most important.
But what is the Constitution's structural commitment?
How do we know? And what norms follow from it? To answer
these questions, Killenbeck says we should begin at the
beginning. The founders of the American constitutional order
were pragmatists who sought workable solutions to serious
problems. The problems grew out of the deficiency-Alexander
Hamilton called it "the imbecility,, 22 Killenbeck calls it the
"chaos"--of the Articles of Confederation, under which states
had primacy, and the national government, such as it was, was
virtually powerless to deal with basic national needs. The
"founding generation," as Killenbeck characterizes it, perceived
the states to be part of the problem, in that they impeded
coordinated solutions. What was required was a national
government, both powerful and efficient. The makers of the
Constitution, therefore, radically altered the character and
content of institutional relations. In matters of national import,
enumerated in the constitutional text, national policy was now to
be supreme, and national institutions were to have "plenary"
authority to enforce it.23 In addition to meeting critical needs,
ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED (2002).
20. See Killenbeck, supra note 2, at 3.
21. RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 88 (1977).
22. THE FEDERALIST No. 15 (Alexander Hamilton).
23. The use of "plenary" in this context can cause confusion, as it has been
commonplace to describe the reserved powers of states as plenary. That is, states' powers
extend to all regulable aspects of human behavior, to promote collective interests in health,
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this arrangement would consolidate union and promote a happy
national existence.
Killenbeck argues that authority to enforce national norms
necessarily implicated the use of judicial power. This power
extended to suits by private parties against states, as authorized
by national law. The ostensible sovereignty of states would not
bar such actions. We know this, he says, from several sets of
sources. One is textual. Article VI's Supremacy Clause was an
obvious clue. More subtly, Article III extended the national
judicial power to controversies "between a State and citizens of
another State" and to those "between a State ... and foreign
States, Citizens or Subjects." Article III, moreover, authorized
the Supreme Court to exercise original jurisdiction in cases "in
which a State shall be a Party." These sources buttressed the
notion of an expansive national power with the suggestion of a
restricted (perhaps non-existent) immunity of states. To prop up
this suggestion, Killenbeck returns to the founders and their
world.
At the time of the founding, the British notion of sovereign
immunity, accurately restated by Blackstone, 24 was essentially
feudal and statist: the jurisdiction of courts did not run against
the monarch.25 This conception had at least two implications in
the parts of British North America that would become the
United States. One was that, if the monarch was sovereign, the
safety, welfare, or morals. Killenbeck uses the term merely to recapitulate a doctrine of
national power that grows out of Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824): that the
nation's power was confined to enumerated objects, like the power to regulate commerce
among the several states, but was supreme and comprehensive within its sphere. Id. at 46;
see also United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 115 (1941) (referring to Congress's power
over commerce as "plenary"); Hoke v. United States, 227 U.S. 308, 323 (1913) (upholding
the White Slave Act, under the Commerce Clause, which delegated a "power ... complete
in itself"); Hipolite Egg Co. v. United States, 220 U.S. 45, 57 (1911) (upholding provisions
of the Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906 as a regulation of health, within the ambit of the
Commerce Clause); Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321, 363 (1903) (upholding prohibition
of the importation, mailing, or interstate transportation of lottery tickets as an exercise of
Congress's power to regulate commerce, though the purpose of the regulation was moral).
But see Lopez, 514 U.S. at 566 (noting that the Constitution "withhold[s] from Congress a
plenary police power").
24. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *49, *230-70 (specifying attributes of
the "royal dignity" of the king).
25. Id. at *232. I use the word "statist" in this context to refer to the governmental
institutions of a nation-state, not to states as local units of government.
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colonies themselves were not. 26 This meant, of course, that they
could not claim immunity as sovereigns. The other implication
derived from the feudal origin and statist character of
Blackstone's notion of sovereignty. Despite the kinship
between the British and emerging American forms of
government, a statist conception of sovereignty was
inappropriate to a constitutionalist polity whose authority
resided ultimately in the people.27 In short, sovereignty in
government-even in local governments possessing rudimentary
democratic processes-was a categorical error in the new
American order.28
26. On the notion that the colonies lacked sovereignty, Joseph Story sometimes
acknowledged that the historical record was not without its complications. He conceded,
for example, that "each [colony], in a limited sense, was sovereign within its own
territory." JOSEPH STORY, 1 COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES § 177 (1833). Where this characterization held, it tended to do so with respect to
matters of internal governance, not with respect to relations among colonies or with other
nations. Id. In any event, the presumption was that the colonies were neither "parcel of the
realm of Great Britain" nor independent, but "dependencies of the British crown." Id. §
175. "Hence, the attributes of sovereignty, perfection, perpetuity, and irresponsibility,
which were inherent in the political capacity of the king, belonged to him in all the
territories subject to the crown," Id. § 184. Again, however, the record is not
straightforward. Thus, when Professor Killenbeck quotes Story for the proposition that
"antecedent to the Declaration of Independence, none of the colonies were, or pretended to
be sovereign states," it is worth noting that Story himself did not frame the proposition in
such stark terms. Killenbeck, supra note 2, at 25. He said merely that the colonies were
not sovereign states, in the sense, in which the term "'sovereign' is sometimes applied to
states." STORY, supra, § 207. That is, the colonies lacked sovereignty "in its largest
sense"-in the sense of possessing "supreme, absolute, uncontrollable power." Id. But the
implication is that they possessed sovereignty in subtle, but limited ways.
27. By "constitutionalism" I have in mind an enterprise in which "people... self-
consciously attempt ... to conceive the design for a new political world.., to embody that
design in some sort of text, and.., to implement it in the world." MARK E. BRANDON,
FREE IN THE WORLD: AMERICAN SLAVERY & CONSTITUTIONAL FAILURE 10 (1998)
[hereinafter BRANDON, FREE N THE WORLD]. Such an enterprise entails at least the
following:
(1) institutions authorized by and accountable to the people (both in the making
of the order and the regular operation of government); (2) some notion of limited
government (whether by the designation of purposes for governmental action,
the specification of rights, or the allocation of authority among institutions); and
(3) rule of law (which connotes the regularization of processes by which public
norms are made and applied).
Mark E. Brandon, War and American Constitutional Order, 56 VAND. L. REV. 1815
(2003).
28. At its inception in the United States, this constitutionalist conception of popular
sovereignty had less to do with a concern for "rule of law"-i.e., for institutions of
government subject to and limited by law-than with popular "political" control of those
institutions. This control extended to the authority to create and dissolve government itself.
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Neither of these implications is to suggest that the states
became irrelevant. They were preserved, says Killenbeck, but
they were demoted, for the Constitution authorized a dynamic
political system with a "superior sovereign" at the head.29 The
Court in Chisholm v. Georgia,30 he argues, properly understood
these implications. The Eleventh Amendment, ratified in 1795,
departed from them in "suits ... commenced or prosecuted
against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or
by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." 31 This was a
limited departure, confined to the facts of Chisholm. In Hans v.
Louisiana, however, the Court read into the Amendment a
general immunity from suits, including those brought by a
state's own citizens. 33 Killenbeck notes that Hans was the final
installment in a series of cases involving not the majestic dignity
of a sovereign but crude attempts by states to avoid paying their
just debts. He argues that the current Court is not only repeating
the error of Hans, but compounding it by extending the holding
to cases in which Congress has authorized the cause of action.
This extension, he says, goes far beyond the framers'
understanding of the proper allocation of institutional authority.
What should the Court be doing in cases in which states
claim exemption or immunity from congressional enactments?
The basic contours of Killenbeck's answer to this question are
clear. First, the Court should give effect to the full range of
national powers. This includes enforcing Congress's enactments
pursuant to its power to regulate commerce. Killenbeck argues
that one controversial application of that power-Wickard v.
Filburn34-was correctly decided. Although the founders in
their own time could not have anticipated present uses of this
power (or others), says Killenbeck, they might well approve of
29. William A. Fletcher, The Diversity Explanation of the Eleventh Amendment: A
Reply to Critics, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1261, 1297 (1989).
30. 2 U.S. (2 Dali.) 419 (1793).
31. U.S. CONST. amend XI.
32. 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
33. Id at 15.
34. 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (upholding the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938 as a
valid regulation of interstate commerce, even when applied to a farmer who grew and
consumed wheat on his own farm, because the economy-wide effect of home consumption
practices would be to reduce demand for wheat and thus lower its interstate price).
[Vol. 57:69
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those uses if they could see today's conditions.35 The founders
would appreciate the need to understand their system in light of
the nation's experience, which has transformed the role of the
national government (and properly so, says Killenbeck).
Second, however, this does not mean the Court should
defer to Congress's invocations of constitutional authority for its
enactments, at least not when there is a colorable countervailing
interest or authority in the states. Thus, the hyger-deferential
version of "rational-basis" review is inappropriate. 6
Third, the Court should employ a heightened (but not strict)
standard of review, akin to a standard sometimes invoked in
cases involving challenges to decisions or policies of
administrative agencies: the "hard look." The inquiry implied
by this standard, says Killenbeck, is not into the substantive fit
between enactment and ostensible authority. It is instead an
examination of the extent to which Congress duly deliberated on
the evidence supporting its enactment.37 This standard is
consistent with James Madison's desire for government that is
not only effective but also deliberative. 38  The Court, then,
should ask whether Congress acted reasonably. 39 Alternatively,
the Court should ask whether the statute in question was
genuinely "necessary and proper." That is, was the subject of
the statute one which the states could not solve, one in which
35. This interpretive strategy has an ancient source. See ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN
ETHics (Horace Rackham trans., Harvard Univ. Press 1947) (1934); see also
BLACKSTONE, supra note 24, at *61.
36. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., 348 U.S. 483 (1955) (upholding,
under very deferential rational basis review, an Oklahoma statute prohibiting anyone other
than licensed optometrists or ophthalmologists from installing lenses in or replacing eye-
glass frames).
37. For a parallel proposal concerning judicial evaluation of legislative fact-finding,
see Phillip P. Frickey, The Fool on the Hill: Congressional Findings, Constitutional
Adjudication, and United States v. Lopez, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 695 (1996).
38. The notion of deliberation lies behind Madison's justification for the structure of
government in the Constitution. See, for example, The Federalist No. 10, in which
Madison argues that an aim of delegating legislative power to "a small number of citizens
elected by the rest" is "to refine and enlarge the public views, by passing them through the
medium of a chosen body of citizens, whose wisdom may best discern the true interest of
their country, and whose patriotism and love of justice, will be least likely to sacrifice it to
temporary or partial considerations." For other examples of Madison's commitment to
deliberation, see The Federalist Nos. 55, 58, 63. For a parallel commitment from
Alexander Hamilton, see The Federalist No. 71.
39. Again, as I read the argument, reasonableness is the fit between policy and
empirical findings, not essentially that between policy and substantive purpose.
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uniform rules or standards are desirable, or one in which there is
a risk that states would defy an appropriate national norm?
Conscientiously applied, says Killenbeck, this standard can
ensure that congressional policy both reflects the people's will
and comports with the limits entailed in constitutional language.
Moreover, it can supply a foundation for critically evaluating the
Court's recent decisions. Hence, the Court was correct to strike
down the Gun-Free School Zones Act in Lopez; but it might
have erred in striking down the Violence Against Women Act in
United States v. Morrison.4 °
II. CRITICAL OBSERVATIONS
There might be reasons to quibble with the first two of
Killenbeck's criticisms of the Court's jurisprudence of
federalism: that it violates stare decisis and that it is incoherent.
With respect to the first, it has long been acknowledged that
stare decisis exerts a less powerful pull in constitutional
adjudication than it does in the common law.4 1  This
acknowledgment may be justified both by the importance of
constitutional judgments (which implies the desirability of
getting them "right") and by the difficulty of altering the Court's
judgments in the political processes for amending the
Constitution.
With respect to the second, we might note that law's
coherence is continually in a condition of flux. This is partly a
function of the dynamic social ground for the creation of legal
norms. As society changes, the rules of law-even those
employed by judges-must adapt if they are to continue to
matter. Another reason for law's continuing flux is built into the
sociology of legal process. Less cryptically, lawyers are
advocates. They are paid, sometimes handsomely, to argue for a
reading of precedents that comports with their clients' needs.
Nor are judges-who are lawyers after all-immune to this
pressure, though they doubtless experience it differently. As
Cardozo recognized, most judges have deep commitments as to
policy and value; and, being mortal, they are frequently,
sometimes imperceptibly, impelled to use law to promote those
40. 529 U.S. 598.
41. See, e.g., 20 AM. JUR. 2D § 161 (2d ed. 2003).
[Vol. 57:69
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aims and values.42
How is it that lawyers on opposing sides can appeal to
identical precedents to support their positions? How is it that
judges of different temperaments or with different aims or
values can equally claim to rely on rules laid down to reach
divergent conclusions about the disposition of a single case? An
answer lies in what Karl Llewellyn identified as kindred
methods of reading prior decisions.43 Simply put, one may read
a precedent strictly or narrowly, confining the holding of a case
closely to its facts; or one may read it liberally or broadly,
giving the holding the fullest potential application to a wide
range of factual scenarios. There is nothing controversial in the
presence of choice between these two methods. They are
standard tools of the profession, and mastering them is an early
piece of the business of first-year law students. Thus, the Court
is not susceptible to criticism when it employs the tools to push
constitutional doctrine down unexpected paths.
Having said this, we should concede to Killenbeck that the
"Federalism Five" are doing more than the standard
distinguishing of prior decisions. For one thing, it is difficult to
square Nevada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs44 with
the Court's other recent decisions on states' sovereign
immunity.45 They are performing, in more radical fashion, like
prototypal Legal Realists. Hence, Killenbeck is correct that the
old-time religion of John Marshall in M'Culloch v. Maryland,46
Gibbons v. Ogden,47 and Willson v. Black-Bird Creek Marsh
Co.4 8 is not the faith of the Federalism Five. They are
jettisoning old rules and adopting new ones. They are not
discovering law, in either the classical sense of Langdel 4 9 or the
42. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 9-12 (1921).
43. KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH: ON OUR LAW & ITS STUDY (4th
prtg. 1973).
44. 538 U.S. 721 (2003).
45. See, e.g., Board of Tr. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001); Kimel v.
Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999);
Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
46. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
47. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
48. 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 245 (1829).
49. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER COLUMBUS LANGDELL, A SELECTION OF CASES ON THE
LAW OF CONTRACTS, WITH REFERENCES & CITATIONS v-vii (1870).
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revisionist sense of Llewellyn;5° they are, in short, making it.
Again, this strategy is permissible, though there are institutional
risks in following it too frequently. But the bottom line is this:
judgment is ultimately one of value or policy, the contest for
which is unavoidably "political," writ small and writ large.
Hence, while Justice Scalia (in another context) may criticize
others for engaging in a kulturkampf,5' he himself is engaged in
a similar struggle. As he recognizes, the prize of this struggle is
the soul of constitutional law, which is, among other things, an
expression of social value. It is at the level of value that
Killenbeck's third criticism resonates: that the Federalism Five
are substantively mistaken. It is to this claim that I devote the
remainder of my attention.
A. Conceptions of the Founding
Some scholars denigrate preoccupation with the
constitutional founding. They disparage it as, at best,
intellectually misguided and, at worst, a kind of fetishism
bordering on necrophilia. 52  I understand these criticisms. In
fact, I too have criticized devotion to originalism as a dominant
or the exclusive method for interpreting the Constitution.
53
Nonetheless, the founding of a constitutionalist order does
matter. It matters not because it is an extraordinary
manifestation of divine intercession in human affairs. 5' Nor
does it matter simply because (or to the extent that) it cranks the
constitutional engine, whether or not it is "a machine that would
go of itself.,55 A founding is significant for a constitutionalist
order because it is an event that must be justified.
Why? An answer, which I have belabored elsewhere,56
begins with the observation that a constitutionalist order
50. See generally supra note 43.
51. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 636 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
52. See, e.g., Barak Cohen, Empowering Constitutionalism with Text from an Israeli
Perspective, 18 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 585, 605 n.87 (2003).
53. BRANDON, FREE IN THE WORLD, supra note 27, at 22-28.
54. See CATHERINE DRINKER BOWEN, MIRACLE AT PHILADELPHIA: THE STORY OF
THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, MAY TO SEPTEMBER 1787 (1966).
55. See MICHAEL KAMMEN, A MACHINE THAT WOULD Go OF ITSELF: THE
CONSTITUTION IN AMERICAN CULTURE (1986) (using the metaphor of the machine to
describe the United States Constitution).
56. BRANDON, FREE IN THE WORLD, supra note 27, at 186-89.
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purports to govern not through "accident and force" but through
"reflection and choice."57 This presumption requires not only
that the actions of such an order be justified in a way that
permits or presupposes reflection and choice, but that its very
existence also be justified. The founding, then, is not a brutish
fact of the matter. It is an event that needs to be explained and
justified. This is so because the authority of the order depends
upon it. And, as we shall see, the characterization of the
founding can have implications for the operation of political
institutions. These considerations help explain the continuing
preoccupation with stories of the founding. The stories matter
to the order, not only to get it up and running but also to keep it
running. Consequently, founding stories matter also to people
who want to use the order to pursue or prevent certain policies.
One difficulty is that, just as the founding is not a given,
neither is any specific view of the founding. Hence, the story
one might tell about it-its formulation, adoption, revision, and
rejection-is contestable. On this point, I part company with
Professor Killenbeck.
He argues for a particular account-a particularly federalist
account-of the American constitutional founding. That is, the
purpose for the Constitution was to create a vigorous, effective
national government, with broad authority and with powers
sufficient to execute that authority. Alexander Hamilton was
fond of this explanation-especially in matters military and
economic-and he had no discernible qualms about speaking of
states as mere political subdivisions of the nation. Without
embracing Hamilton's hyper-nationalism, John Marshall
explained how the procedure for ratifying the Constitution
presupposed a nationalist purpose. The Constitution was
authorized by the people of the nation. In authorizing the new
57. THE FEDERALIST No. 1 (Alexander Hamilton).
58. "Stories" here need not imply "fictions," though they might (and often) do so.
Suffice it to say that we might think of founding stories as factual accounts, as mythic
fictions, or as some combination of the two.
59. JAMES MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787
129-39 (1987) (containing Hamilton's remarks in the Constitutional Convention); THE
FEDERALIST No. 27 (Alexander Hamilton); cf Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 971
(1997) (Souter, J. dissenting) (arguing that Hamilton's position in The Federalist, No. 27
permits the United States to harness the judicial power of the states to enforce national
law).
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order, they acted in states, but they did not act for states. The
people acted for themselves as members of a national union.
"The government of Union... is, emphatically and truly, a
government of the people. [I]t emanates from them. Its powers
are granted by them, and are to be exercised directly on them,
and for their benefit."
60
This may be an appealing account-especially for many
today, in the wake of the Civil War and the New Deal-and it
doubtless captured the sense of many who framed or ratified the
Constitution or who lived at the time of the founding. But it was
not the only way to understand the character of the actions that
made the Constitution. During the debates over ratification,
James Madison invoked a countervailing characterization, which
presumed that the authority of the Constitution (and hence of the
national government), derived from "the people, not as
individuals composing one entire nation, but as composing the
distinct and independent States to which they respectively
belong. It is to be the assent and ratification of the several
States.' Madison himself was conflicted over the implications
of this account. He was sometimes a committed localist and
sometimes a nationalist. For our purposes, however, the bottom
line is this: From the beginning, the characterization of the
Constitution's authority was contested.
Of course, the Constitution itself was also contested. The
advocates we know as the Antifederalists opposed it.62 Some of
them did so because they feared it was too strongly nationalist as
Hamilton and Marshall described it. The federalist description
of the Constitution thus became a reason for the Antifederalists
to oppose it. In the years after ratification, however, the localists
did not spurn the Constitution. For one thing, it would have
been quixotic to do so, given its rapid entrenchment in the
various polities of the United States. For another, many localists
perceived that the Constitution brought genuine benefits. For
still another, some saw that it was possible to embrace the
Constitution as an instrument for preserving a significant degree
60. M'Culloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 404-05.
61. THE FEDERALIST No. 39 (James Madison).
62. See generally HERBERT J. STORING, WHAT THE ANTI-FEDERALISTS WERE FOR
(1981) (providing a systematic treatment of the views of those who opposed the adoption
of the Constitution).
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of localism. They could view the Constitution in this light in
part because of the Tenth Amendment, which was ratified in
1791, and in part because Madison's localist account of the
Constitution's authority was available. This conversion of
Antifederalists (and their political descendants), from opponents
of the Constitution to faithful adherents to it, laid the foundation
for a contest over the basic meaning and institutional structure of
the order. The contest continues today to be the source of a
dynamic tension in the order. There is reason to think that
Madison would not bemoan this circumstance. He argued that
this sort of conflict--"horizontal" competition among
institutions of the national government and the "vertical"
division of authority between the nation and states-was crucial
to the proper operation of the constitutional order.
63
Like them or not, therefore, the Federalist Five have a
legitimate claim as participants in that contest. If they are
wrong, it is not because of a mistaken view of the founding. On
the other hand, if they are right, it is not because they have the
correct account of the founding; for there is more than one
possible correct account. And the contest between (or among)
them is a matter of constitutional politics.
B. The Constitutional Politics of Nation and States
Killenbeck would oppose the notion that there is more than
one possible correct view of the constitutional creation, but he
might embrace a weakened version of my other observations.
He can claim, for example, that his founders are not stuck in a
mythic or long passed past, but have adapted (or are adaptable)
as the order itself has changed over the centuries. Hence his
urging that we bring the founders forward to our own time to see
whether they would approve of present nationalist policies. He
might argue that, as Justice Holmes put it, the founders "created
an organism;" they "called into life a being the development of
which could not have been foreseen completely by the most
gifted of its begetters."64
But what has been the character of that "development? ' 65
63. THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison).
64. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920).
65. Id I use Holmes's term, without adopting it as my own, for it presumes a theme
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Holmes posited that it was a gradual trajectory toward
nationhood.66 This position may have been informed by his
having fought on the winning, nationalist side of the Civil War.
It might also have stemmed from a skeptical or cosmopolitan
aversion to provincialism. Or it might have been traceable to an
Hegelian sense that history's unfolding is teleological-not only
dynamic, but progressive; the thrust is toward universality, of
which the nation-state was the presumptive embodiment. In
fact, however, Holmes was sometimes suspicious of the
teleological view,68 and he was right to be. History frequently
proceeds in fits and starts. Even if it does not boil down to
Holmes's youthful fancy of rule of the stronger, neither does it
invariably follow a clean, linear, and well-lighted path. The end
is not consistently clear (in part because the beginning is not).
Such is the nature of political conflict. And such has been the
nature of American constitutional experience. I cannot recount
that experience in detail here. Instead, I shall briefly refer to the
general contours of three periods in which themes of federalism
were distinctly apparent. The periods and themes are familiar to
anyone acquainted with American constitutional history: the
antebellum period, the regime after the Civil War, and the New
Deal.
The battle lines between nationalism and localism were
of progress that I think is frequently empirically unjustified even if it is normatively
attractive.
66. Id.
67. See, e.g., Louis MENAND, THE METAPHYSICAL CLUB: A STORY OF IDEAS IN
AMERICA 263-68 (2001).
68. In his essay on "Natural Law," for example, Holmes observed:
I used to say, when I was young, that truth was the majority vote of that nation
that could lick all the others. Certainly we may expect that the received opinion
about the present war [World War I] will depend a good deal upon which side
wins (I hope with all my soul it will be mine).... I love granite rocks and
barberry bushes, no doubt because with them were my earliest joys that reach
back through the past eternity of my life. But while one's experience thus makes
certain preferences dogmatic for oneself, recognition of how they came to be so
leaves one able to see that others, poor souls, may be equally dogmatic about
something else. And this again means scepticism. Not that one's belief or love
does not remain. Not that we would not fight and die for it if important-we all,
whether we know it or not, are fighting to make the kind of world that we should
like-but that we have learned to recognize that others will fight and die to make
a different world, with equal sincerity or belief.... [H]is grounds are just as
good as ours.
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Natural Law, 32 HARV. L. REv. 40, 40-41 (1918).
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visible in the earliest years of the republic. In fact, Chief Justice
Marshall's jurisprudence embodied the tension. Although he
was a committed nationalist on most matters of commerce, 69 he
was localist in his understanding of the reach of the Bill of
Rights70 and in his approach to slavery.71 His successor, Roger
Brooke Taney, however, tended to be localist on matters of
commerce (except when a national policy benefited interests of
agriculture),72 but he became a nationalist where the protection
of slavery was concerned.73
The Civil War and the post-War amendments would seem
to have struck the balance decisively in favor of the nation. The
Supreme Court, however, pushed the genie of nationhood back
into the constitutional bottle. In the Slaughter-House Cases,
74
for example, the Court denied a constitutional challenge to a
local monopoly.75  In the Civil Rights Cases,76 the Court
circumscribed Congress's authority to proscribe certain
violations of civil rights. 77 The one area in which the Court was
receptive to a nationalist approach was protection for capital.
The Court not only nationalized this protection but entrenched it
constitutionally against many forms of regulation by any level of
78government. Among the doctrinal devices the Court employed
to this end were the Due Process and Contracts Clauses (against
regulation by states) and the Tenth Amendment and dual
sovereignty (against regulation by Congress).
The event that eventually shook the Court from its servility
to capital was an economic crash, the Great Depression, which
threatened the survival of the order. This collapse was so broad
and deep that neither capital alone nor the intervention of states
seemed adequate to meet it. Even so, the Court waited out the
Depression for eight years before disavowing its anti-
69. See, e.g., Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 1; M'Culloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 316.
70. See Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833).
71. See generally BRANDON, FREE IN THE WORLD, supra note 27, at 50-55.
72. See generally THE OXFORD COMPANION TO THE SUPREME COURT 857-59
(Kermit L. Hall et. al. eds. 1992).
73. See BRANDON, FREE IN THE WORLD, supra note 27, at 99-100, 109-115.
74. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872).
75. Id. at 60, 81.
76. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
77. Id. at 25.
78. The cases of and secondary literature on this period are massive. See, e.g., Adair
v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
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government jurisprudence. 79 When it did switch, why did it do
so? Doubtless, the answer was at least partly the gravitational
pull of constitutional politics. Franklin Roosevelt's
administration prodded Congress to enact (and to re-enact)
national legislation whose purpose was to address the crisis.
When he failed to obtain an opportunity to appoint a new Justice
during his first term, Roosevelt pursued a plan to "pack" the
Court.8°  Despite popular conception, the plan was not
responsible for turning the tide. 81 But it was emblematic of a
political environment that made the Court's anti-democratic
positions increasingly untenable-at least for an institution
whose members might want to continue to be respected.
The idea that one might influence the composition of the
Court by altering the number of Justices was not novel. Lincoln
had achieved this policy, as had Jackson before him. But
underlying Roosevelt's strategy was something new. His
political program presupposed two constitutional norms: (1) a
capacious view of the national authority with energy and
authority to regulate a wide range of human endeavors; and (2)
an insistence that national institutions cooperate in pursuing
national goals and implementing national policy. The first norm
rested on Marshall's familiar nationalism. The second,
however, made Roosevelt's position an innovation in American
constitutional thought.
As we saw briefly above, James Madison posited that,
under the Constitution, the preservation of liberty depended on
the independence of national institutions, which in turn
depended upon competition among them. There is reason to
believe that Madison's conception of liberty in this context was
a collective liberty of (local) self-government instead of a more
modem, individualist liberty. I shall not try to defend this
reading here. For whichever version he intended, institutional
competition was the key to conserving it: "Ambition must be
made to counteract ambition. The interest of the man must be
79. See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 49 (1937) (upholding the
National Labor Relations Act).
80. FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT, ADDRESS BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES
[ON REORGANIZING THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY] (Mar. 9, 1937), S. REP. No. 711, app. D at
41-45 (1937).
81. See MURPHY ET AL., supra note 16, at 1078-79.
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connected with the constitutional rights of the place." 82 And the
upshot of this arrangement was not to promote efficient
government; on the contrary, it was to erect barriers to ensure
inefficiency.
Roosevelt's political program exploited Madison's
conception of "opposite and rival interests" as a tactical matter
in order to overturn it as a matter of principle. 83 The Court's
acquiescence marked the victory of both planks of the New
Deal: enhanced regulative authority in Congress and a
diminished role for the Court in policing the constitutional limits
to national legislation-at least with respect to social and
economic policy.84  During Roosevelt's tenure, the Court's
repudiation of its pro-capitalist jurisprudence famously
culminated in Wickard v. Filburn,85 a decision that Killenbeck
embraces. Initially, the Court's acquiescence was temporary, to
deal with the economic emergency. When that crisis, however,
merged seamlessly into world war, then into cold war, and later
extended to civil rights and the Great Society, the foundation
was laid for a continuous national power.
Killenbeck's critique of the Federalism Five is essentially a
friendly revision of New-Deal constitutionalism. This is not to
disparage the aims of the New Deal or of Killenbeck's thesis. It
is merely to emphasize the congeniality of the two and
consequently to make a point about the origins of his
jurisprudence, which may owe less to the founders (or even one
subset of founders) than to the exigencies of maintaining a
nation-state in times of economic, military, and social crisis.
This view of constitutional change is fine. In fact I think it is
correct. I disagree, however, with what I take to be an implicit
assumption of Killenbeck's account of change: that
constitutional development works in only one direction. On the
contrary, as the Court and nation have frequently demonstrated,
history is not a one-way ratchet. Thus, if Roosevelt could
reverse the founders on certain points, perhaps the New Deal too
is subject to reversal (even interment). This, of course, is an aim
82. THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison).
83. Id.
84. See, e.g., United States v. Carolene Prods Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938); West Coast
Hotel v. Parish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
85. 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
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of the Federalism Five.
C. The Role of the Court
Professor Killenbeck, in contrast, revises New-Deal
constitutionalism to save it, not to bury it. His revision is to
posit for adjudicating the constitutionality of national policy a
new standard of review: the hard look. As noted above, this
standard focuses more on the process by which legislation is
enacted than on the substantive fit between policy and purpose.
Also as noted, the hard look has found expression in recent cases
in administrative law. But the general ground for a process-
based approach to adjudication extends far beyond these
decisions.
One of the earliest examples resides in a dissent in an early
nineteenth-century case from Pennsylvania's supreme court. In
86Eakin v. Raub, Justice Gibson urged that the courts of
Pennsylvania lacked authority to adjudicate the substantive
compatibility of the legislature's enactments with the state's
constitution. 87 Such courts did possess authority, he claimed, to
inquire into the "forms" of the Constitution-to ensure that the
legislature complied with procedural prerequisites for enacting
laws.88 Was the law enacted by majorities in both houses and
approved by the executive, or, if vetoed, overridden by super-
majorities in both houses? If not, judges are not obliged to
enforce it. If so, the enactment is binding on courts, regardless
of its substance.
Killenbeck extends the procedural prerequisites beyond
these textually grounded rules to encompass also an extra-
textual standard: deliberation. There is no denying the value of
deliberation. Evaluating the adequacy of process, moreover, is
generally conceded to be within the competence of courts.
89
Notwithstanding these considerations, is this standard
constitutionally appropriate in this context?
One possible objection is that it violates the Constitution's
86. 12 Serg. & Rawle 330 (Pa. 1825), available at 1825 WL 1913, at *1 (Apr. 16,
1825).
87. Id. at *15-16 (Gibson, J., dissenting).
88. Id. at *15-16, *20-21 (Gibson, J., dissenting).
89. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY & DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL
REVIEW 73-104 (1980).
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criteria for legal validity. We might state the objection more
concretely: The sole criteria for the validity of a legislative
enactment are those expressly contained in the procedural rules
of Article 1.90 There are three elements to this objection. They
are that the constitutional criteria for the validity of an
enactment (1) must appear expressly in the text of the
Constitution, (2) must be rules and not standards, and (3) must
be procedural and not substantive. These elements are partially
independent from one another, but all are rooted in a particular
theory of law: legal positivism (and a crude version of
positivism at that). A comprehensive treatment and rebuttal of
this objection are available but would take me far beyond the
limited purpose for these remarks. I shall rest, therefore, on an
unambitious observation. If the Court were to adopt any one of
the elements as unequivocal requirements, it would have to
abandon so many of its prior decisions that it would effectively
have to rebuild its constitutional jurisprudence from the
foundation. This, of course, is theoretically possible, but it is
unlikely on terms that the Court would accept.
A second possible objection is that Killenbeck's standard
provides insufficient protection against overreaching by
Congress. In short, as long as Congress can build a substantial
record establishing that it duly considers a particular
phenomenon to be a national problem, it may enact virtually any
policy it chooses. There is something to this worry. I suspect
the only way to meet it is to impose a requirement not (only) of
deliberation, but (also) of substantive consistency with
Congress's authority. In short, we cannot avoid asking whether
Congress's policy bears a reasonable relation to a congressional
power enumerated in the Constitution. Killenbeck seems
conflicted about this move. At times, he seems to acknowledge
its relevance. At others, however, he seems skeptically inclined
to think that talk about rational bases will inexorably entail a
deferential standard too flimsy to protect against unauthorized
actions by Congress. I think the skeptical worry unwarranted. It
90. Something of this crude version of positivism may lie beneath Judge
Easterbrook's opinion in United States v. Marshall, 908 F.2d 1312 (7th Cir. 1990).
"Although nothing in the legislative history suggests that Congress went through such a
process of reasoning, it need not. Judges assess the validity of legislative decisions; we do
not assign grades to legislative deliberations." Id. at 1325.
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is possible, that is, to do serious analytical work with rational-
basis review. It requires not only that the Court refuse to
manufacture reasons or evidence, but also that it take seriously
the need to establish a substantive rational connection between
policy and power. Killenbeck hints that such substantive
analysis could supplement the Court's inquiry into deliberation.
I would make the substantive component more visible and less
equivocal.
In fact, I would make it primary. The reason rests on a
third objection that grows out of the second: As to acts of
Congress, the standard is impractical. In light of the
vicissitudes, purposes, procedures, and strategic opportunities of
the legislative process, it will be difficult to construct workable
criteria for specifying and applying the standard of deliberation.
I am largely persuaded on this point by Jesse Choper's
criticisms, 1 and I worry that Killenbeck defends inadequately
against them. This is not to say that a defense is categorically
unavailable. It is to say only that I do not presently see it.
I confess an ambivalent sympathy for a fourth objection,
which partly cuts against the third. Even if evaluative criteria
are available, the Court should refrain from using the standard.
It is one thing to apply it to decisions of administrative agencies,
which have an ambiguous and unexalted constitutional status. It
is another to apply it to Congress, which is the primary seat of
lawmaking power for the nation. For the Court to pick apart
policies solely because they lack requisite deliberation seems
insufficiently sensitive-dare I say it?-to the dignity of
Congress. My ambivalence stems from my sense that corruption
and imbecility frequently taint the electoral and legislative
processes at the national level (for that matter, at all levels) of
government. Conceding this taint, the upshot of the fourth
objection would be that, in this context, the remedy should lie,
for the most part, in hands other than the Court's.
92
91. See Jesse H. Choper, Taming Congress's Power Under the Commerce Clause:
What Does the Near Future Portend?, 55 ARK. L. REv. 731 (2003).
92. "For the most part" presupposes, at a minimum, that basic institutions and
practices of democracy are in place. Put differently, it presupposes that the channels for
political change are open. See ELY, supra note 89, at 105-34.
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D. "Sovereign" Immunity
I close happily on a note of partial agreement with
Professor Killenbeck. He suggests that the notion of sovereign
immunity is a categorical error as applied to state
governments. 93 This is an important insight, for it suggests that
the Court is doing battle against the very Constitution it
professes to defend. Killenbeck emphasizes that the Court's
present Eleventh-Amendment jurisprudence alters the order by
upending national supremacy. As indicated above, there is no
denying that the Court has essentially nullified John Marshall's
conception of national power as capable of binding and
constraining even states. But there are two other ways in which
the Court has threatened constitutionalist values that are at least
as fundamental as national supremacy. One is that the Court has
relocated sovereignty from the people, who ostensibly created
the order, to government, which is their creation. In a
constitutionalist polity, if sovereignty is a sensible and workable
notion, it must reside in people not in states (not even nation-
states). This precept is so basic that ignoring it risks a
fundamental alteration of the order.94  The other is that it
threatens to undermine a basic tenet of rule of law: Where there
is a right there is a remedy, even when the wrong-doer is a
government or a governmental official.95
There might be valid reasons for wanting to insulate
government from certain sorts of legal actions. Among the
reasons might be protecting the public fisc or preventing policies
of governments from being picked apart by legal claims. These
are cogent considerations of policy, and they might even
implicate states' "dignity," in a weak sense of that word.96 But
93. James Pfander has done interesting and suggestive work challenging the
sovereign immunity of both states and the United States. See, e.g., James E. Pfander,
Sovereign Immunity and the Right to Petition: Toward a First Amendment Right to Pursue
Judicial Claims Against the Government, 91 Nw. U. L. REV. 899 (1997); James E.
Pfander, Waiver of Sovereign Immunity in the "Plan of the Convention," I GEO. J. L. &
PUB. POL. 13 (2002); see also Erwin Chemerinsky, Against Sovereign Immunity, 53 STAN.
L. REV. 1201 (2001).
94. See BRANDON, FREE IN THE WORLD, supra note 27, at 50-51.
95. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 162-63 (1803); see also Alden,
527 U.S. at 760-814 (Souter, J., dissenting).
96. By "dignity," I have in mind nothing more than a place of importance within the
political order. This usage is distinct from the notion of "human dignity," which is
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they have nothing to do with states' possessing sovereignty.
sometimes promoted as a constitutional value. Compare William J. Brennan, Jr., The
Constitution of the United States: Contemporary Ratification, 27 S. TEX. L. REV. 433
(1985-1986), with Judith Resnik & Julie Chi-hye Suk, Adding Insult to Injury: Questioning
the Role of Dignity in Conceptions of Sovereignty, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1921, 1960-62
(2003). And it is antagonistic to Blackstone's notion of royal prerogative. See
BLACKSTONE, supra note 24, at *49, *230-70.
